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Abstract: It is debated how much conceptualizations of the phenomenon of 
gated communities under the lenses of public choice theory may configure a 
misleading approach. The typifying of goods by mainstream economics is briefly 
presented and discussed, attention being directed to how much these must (and 
should) be institutionally rooted discussions. Shortcomings of economics-inspired 
discourse in capturing the logics of political life are underlined. The eruption of 
gated communities is referred to obvious deficiencies in public provision of goods 
that are often characteristic of situations of blockages in development processes 
and high inequalities in the distribution of both wealth and political and symbolic 
resources. These traits have clear implications in the shifting definition of limits 
between private and public spheres across societies. The cumulative circular 
causations of these phenomena are highlighted, as well as their largely 
“performative” nature. 
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Political Remarks on the Notion of Gated Communities as Club Goods 
Associated with the usual distinction between “public goods” and “private 
goods”, the first being allegedly non exclusive and not producers of rivalry, the 
second observing both those characteristics, come also frequent references to the 
so-called “common goods” and “club goods”. According to the usual definition by 
mainstream economics (Buchanan 1965), common goods verify rivalry but not 
exclusivity, therefore being connected with the infamous problem of the “tragedy 
of commons”. Club goods, on the contrary, are not producer of rivalry (at least up 
to a certain point of congestion), but are susceptible of being made exclusive.  
Since discussions concerning problems of gated communities have 
recurrently referred these to the category of club goods, it is convenient to start 
by underlining the mostly conventional character of all the four previously 
mentioned categories, as well as its so to speak “ideal typical” nature. In fact, all 
this debate is acknowledged to be intermingled with the broader problem of 
“externalities”, or reciprocal repercussions (both positive and negative) of the 
various economic activities, which still are not expressed in explicit transactions. 
This way, even a good almost unanimously referred to the group of public goods, 
security, only in a very imperfect manner can indeed be conglobated into that 
category — in case, of course, we take into consideration that the 
aforementioned production of security, both concerning “external” and “internal” 
aggressions, becomes possible only within the context of the existence of a State 
able to exert the twin functions, which besides classical liberalism recognizes and 
attributes it, of a soldier and a policeman. Well, the fact is that every State, even if 
minimal according to the likes of classical liberalism, presupposes taxes, therefore 
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sovereignty, ergo politics, explicitly or only allusively considered. Consumption of 
security may therefore be reasonably taken as something non exclusive and not 
producer of exhaustion… within certain institutional arrangements making that 
possible, and only in that case. In its foundations there has to be a political 
authority sufficiently recognized as legitimate as to be able to carry on with the 
imperative collect of resources necessary for the provision of such and such goods 
and services, which may then be defined as “public goods”. If not, no deal. 
Other than the purpose of underlining the convenient consideration of the 
dimensions of political “embeddedness” associated with economic activities, 
these notes are also meant as an invitation to meditate how much the theme of 
“externalities”, hence also the typifying of goods within the aforementioned 
classificatory scheme, is something of culturally “embedded” (as it is nowadays 
fashionable to say) not only in which concerns the activities that are the object of 
study, but also, and specially, as to the way they are considered both by laymen’s 
common sense and by academic jargons and mental frameworks. Up to a 
relatively short while ago, more or less two decades, the issue of smoking or not 
smoking was usually taken as a merely private matter, at least concerning 
informed consenting adults. Nowadays, on the contrary, it would be quite difficult 
not to be alert to the problems of wrongdoings, or “negative externalities” 
connected with the practice of smoking. Under these circumstances, what’s there 
to be done? Should we forbid that practice? Fine it? Confine it? Burden it with 
heavy taxation? An ingenious combination of all that? 
I choose, of course, to leave these discussions to other more illustrious and 
subtle than myself. My aim here is more limited: it’s about highlighting how much 
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the mentioned categorizations have of culturally limited. When, for instance, The 
Hollies have written the famous song according to which “sometimes, all I need is 
the air that I breathe and to love you”, they have presumably not thought of 
extending their metaphor on non exclusivity and non rivalry to, say… a person 
with a lung cancer in its terminal stages? What about the crew of a sinking 
submarine? Or maybe our city dwellers in central streets during rush hours? 
Certainly not, and therefore my conflict is not with poetry, rather with certain 
economics-inspired lines of reasoning that carry those who follow them to be 
obsessed by the metaphors of the “dismal science”, thereby getting blind and 
loosing conscience of precisely that — it’s metaphors we’re dealing with there, 
and only that. 
A phenomenon closely associated with long run development processes is 
surely the growing dimension of the scale and proportion of the economic 
intervention of political powers, taken under the form of the ratio: public 
spending / GDP. It was besides Adam Smith (1999) to register that fact, the 
illustrious Scottish philosopher observing, somewhere in The Wealth of Nations 
(Book V, Chapters II and III), that the most taxed countries, both in absolute and 
relative terms, were precisely those by then richer, namely the Netherlands and 
Great Britain. Smith’s “anti-statist” bias, however, prevented him from 
recognizing that fact as an intrinsically logical one, therefore limiting to take it as a 
mere paradox and asserting that wealthier nations can, because they are 
wealthier, pay more taxes, still without taxes providing any positive contribution 
to the “progresses of opulence”. But is it really so? The same Adam Smith 
mentions in his work the possibility of making public powers intervene in the 
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enterprising of works of public utility, which were still not in conditions of being 
endeavored with profit by private actors (idem, Book V, Chapter I, Part III; Vol. 2: 
310-311). In these cases, all right, admitted Smith, let’s bring the State back in… 
but always considering them as very punctual exceptions to a general golden rule 
of non-interventionism.       
That which Smith took as exceptions others who came later chose to take, all 
too obviously, as a rule, particularly once the persistent tendency was 
acknowledged of proportionally more intervener states coexisting with wealthier 
economies. “Wagner’s law”, that’s how that statistical fact was called, according 
to the name of the German “socialist of the chair” that called the attention to it, 
Adoph Wagner. Mainstream economics’ subsequent jargon, particularly via the 
mentioned expression of “externalities”, came to more or less recognize that 
same fact. But academic economics continued, as we saw, up to our times victim 
of a corset of simplifying hypotheses, metaphors and “ideal types” that tend to 
point to the fundamental unrealism, or “autism”, of main argumentative lines. 
At any rate, the truth is that states are there: important, decisive even in 
contexts inclining to the doctrinaire or ideological denial of its fundamental 
goodness and helpfulness. What do I mean by this? That almost all the processes 
of economic development, and more so with those that correspond to a broad 
notion of human development — development as a universal right to a long and 
healthy life, for example, as with Amartya Sen’s (1999) and Martha Nussbaum’s 
(1993, 2000) famous definition — not only generally presuppose a growing State 
intervention, as in return tend to allow and/or propitiate it. The expression of 
“downwards fiscal spirals” has been used to denote the situation of countries 
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arrested in the so-called retard’s trap: the more budget difficulties one has, the 
more public spending has to be cut, which has a negative repercussion on the 
global achievement of the economy, therefore also on the basis for subsequent 
collection of taxes, etc. Analogously, one should also mention the “upwards fiscal 
spiral” that corresponds to success trajectories: public powers, in more happy 
cases, tend to provide not only safety (which they do besides usually better than 
those of poorer countries), but also universal health care, education and 
professional training, guaranties of yearnings in situations of old age, illness and 
handicaps (public systems of welfare) and so forth. Sometimes this goal imposes 
the generalization of compulsive insurance systems, which can still, under certain 
circumstances, be pursued by private corporations. This is not the time or the 
place to discuss the analytical and practical problems associated with those cases. 
My aim is instead, and in a rather more limited way, to underline that in all that is 
implied a broader State intervention, a more than proportional increase of public 
spending, ergo also of taxes and/or public deficits. Is this process sustainable? 
Definitely, one may answer a clear yes. But let us pay attention! Neither must we 
take all this for definitely granted. On the one hand, and although the relative 
weight of State intervention points to a growth in the long and very long term, 
there are also no doubt oscillations in that tendency. What’s more, the rhythms of 
growth come also undeniably associated with constraints and/or propitiations of 
an institutional and moreover cultural order. The tendency may well be ascendant 
in both Europe and the USA, for example, but for equal GDP per capita State 
intervention is consistently lesser in the USA than in Europe, greater in 




These differences allow the highlighting of how much the progression (or 
not) of the phenomenon of gated communities is itself a socially contingent fact. 
One of the aspects with which it may be intimately connected is, as already 
alluded to, the bigger or lesser efficiency of public powers in the provision of what 
is usually considered a public good, security, but must more realistically be 
designated as an “imperfect public good”, a “semi-public good”, or by appealing 
to more or less akin formulae. The richer a country is, the safer it tends to be, and 
reciprocally: inasmuch it becomes safer it is allowed to continue to get richer 
more at ease. But this is obviously far from telling it all. If one of the dimensions 
of the demand for gated communities is unquestionably safety, another that all 
too often comes with it is the quest for distinction, that is, conspicuous 
consumption, or in other terms the signalizing of social position or status. If on 
the other hand we consider this second dimension, we have to recognize it is 
inextricably associated with questions of bigger or smaller social inequalities, be 
these measured under the form of Gini coefficients in the distribution of 
yearnings or others, and even more broadly with aspects of mental mappings, of 
“social construction of reality” concerning which we must first and most 
underline: 1) they imply a strongly particularistic world-vision, one supported by 
the clear demarcation of a “Us” and a “Them”, that is, of groups of insiders and 
other (presumably bigger) of outsiders; 2) they have an eminently “performative” 
character , that is, they tend to produce social reality inasmuch they are supposed 
to portrait it.      
This way, via enunciating the general conditions of the discussion of the 
gated communities phenomenon by referring it to the over mentioned typifying 
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of goods, we get a certain number of registers and safeguards that one must now 
enunciate more clearly. First of all, this is a typology pointing to extreme cases, 
whose practical observance it is usually very hard to abide with. Secondly, at any 
rate the very typology is institutionally conditioned: that which in certain societies 
is considered to be a public good, therefore as a tendency produced as such, in 
other social environments may well assume the form of private, common or club 
goods, all depending of the mental framings by social values and correspondent 
political structures. We should keep this in mind very clearly, since the 
“performative” aspects of economic phenomena is generally ignored by 
mainstream economics, even if some trends in economic sociology, psychology 
and anthropology have more or less underlined it. 
Thirdly, empirical factual discrepancies from the supra mentioned typology 
are various, all of them resulting from the logical fact of that typology 
corresponding to a metaphor, which implies that too much reliance on its 
dispositions induces researchers to fall into what Gaston Bachelard (1967) called 
“situation of generalized metaphor” (cf. Lecourt 1972: 35). Let us, as to that, take 
the example of what in Portugal are called the “baldios”, an apparently obvious 
case of correspondence to what is usually designated as “commons”. It would be 
expectable that the mentioned “tragedy of commons” would occur in this case 
since, as we know (or think to know), everybody’s business is nobody’s business, 
etc. And yet, any factual knowledge of reality allows for an easy recognition that 
such a tragedy only very seldom happens, since it’s also obvious the presence 
here of certain forms of collective monitoring that avoid that exhaustion.  
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Conclusion: in this case we are, therefore, facing a “club good” and not a 
“common good”, as a conventional wisdom would probably sustain? Or rather, 
and more pertinently: by this way we are practicing an intellectual cheap trick, 
allowing us to twist the reality according to our likes and endlessly adjust it to the 
scheme we started with, thereby “seeing” club goods and/or common goods 
when and ever (but only then) we want to see them? 
In fourth place, we must highlight the tendency to a growing State 
intervention in the economy within very long time horizons, which is besides 
intimately connected with the civilizing dynamics expressed in the very processes 
of economic growth. This one, as it has been often said but seldom remarked, 
produces multiple needs that only the very process is in conditions to satisfy, if 
only incompletely. That fact tends to imply the systematic redefinition of what is 
private and public matter. Universal health is something that doesn’t affect me 
negatively, at the most positively, but the fact is that an increasingly intrusive 
State (imposing universal vaccination programs, for instance) understandably 
tends to be more and more demanding in fiscal terms. This is admittedly a 
somewhat extreme case, but also an unavoidable one, of systematic redefinition 
of limits of public and private spheres.       
Fifth, these “fiscal spirals”, be them ascendant or descendant, tend to self-
reinforcement also (or even mainly) via the correlative changing of mentalities. 
Concerning the classification of welfare states it is often mentioned the study by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) who considers, side by side with a “Scandinavian” or 
“social-democrat” model of social rights conceived as universal rights, another 
one said to be “continental European”, allegedly “conservative”, reporting social 
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contributions to a civic and political counterpart, a production of patriot loyalty 
and/or even a purpose of mobilization against external foes, and also a third one 
called “Anglo-Saxon” or “liberal”, where social help committed to the State is 
supposed to be residual or subsidiary. To Esping-Andersens’s typifying we can, 
indeed, add other categories, a “Latin” or “south European” model having for 
example been mentioned, relying on the importance of social networks 
correspondent to various models of enlarged family. Of course, it is not my aim to 
come to terms with this discussion, but we must in any case notice that the 
representation of public social help as a counterpart to something (“social 
insertion”, for instance), instead of a true universal right, induces several 
dynamics that tend to deepen the difficulties in the public perception of funds 
necessary to its preservation. That is to say: a model which is ostensibly more 
prone to the spending of public money, up to prodigality (as least according to 
appearances), indeed creates less problems usually associated with getting 
finances, whereas presumably less spending models, precisely because of the 
induction of endless quarreling about what is and what is not fair to pay to this 
and that, in truth generate greater difficulties in obtaining the resources 
necessary to its very preservation. In the first case there is a bigger tendency to 
consider what each one  does or does not with the help he/she gets form the 
State as a sheer private matter, unsusceptible of monitoring by public powers or 
by whoever; comparable, if you will, to the air that one breathes, and therefore of 
each one and of all. In the “continental European” model, by contrast, there is a 
bigger inclination to meditate on the problem of the possible free-riding of 
recipients (do unemployed receptors of subsidies develop all the efforts they 
were supposed to in the so-called “active quest for jobs”?, for example), 
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contributions being assumed to be not a true public good, at the most a semi-
public one. Within the “Anglo-Saxon” and the “Latin” models, as it is obvious, all 
this is valid a fortiori, although in the “Latin” case something should be added 
concerning possible “club goods” in principle associated with social networks. 
Another point worth mentioning is how much different institutional 
arrangements induce very significant fluctuations in the borderlines of each one 
of the above mentioned types of goods. What is more: the analytical dispositions 
susceptible of reclassifications are, in good truth, unlimited. Corresponding to the 
Scandinavian situation, or if you will as a rationale for it, we have for instance 
social contributions referring to the so-called “third citizenship” considered not as 
a true public spending, rather as an investment, as it was famously sustained by 
Gunnar Myrdal (1960). Let us not so much try to speculate whether this idea is 
true or not, although high levels of GDP per capita in Scandinavian countries 
suggest a clear yes. Instead, let us rather register that the more protective a 
society is vis-à-vis its misfortunate, the more still it tends to be in subsequent 
moments. And the opposite cumulative circular causations, or “cascade effects”, 
are obviously also valid in societies less prone to welfare, the rationalizing 
dispositions being here to a large extent the opposite ones: the more roughly a 
society treats its misfortunate and stigmatizes them, the more they do tend to 
think of themselves as free-riders and act as such, which in turn, etc. As to 
delimitations of what is public and what is private, they suffer correspondently 
meaningful fluctuations. In Sweden, what each one does with unemployment 
subsidies is a strict business of each one… precisely because those subsidies are 
warranted to everyone as a public help, or a good that is conceived as a “public 
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good” or equivalent. On the contrary, inasmuch the model is more prone to mere 
poorhouses posture, or “charity”, the ambit for public surveillance advances… in 
the exact measure as the supplying of help is not conceptualized as a true 
receptor’s right, therefore at least partially conceived as a private good, i. e., 
exclusive and generator of rivalries. 
To somehow summarize these considerations we must notice how much the 
mental dispositions characteristic of mainstream economics, and particularly the 
so-called public choice theory, i. e., its extension as an alleged conceptualizing of 
politics, is a deficient frame of analysis, indeed quite unable to capture the 
wealth, multidimensionality and complexity of social life, particularly in its 
political dimensions, thereby inducing into a certain number of somehow 
“typical” errors and analytical misdemeanors. Amongst these comes of course the 
assumption of the so-called “rational agent”, or homo economicus, with his utility-
maximizing tendencies, his sufficient information concerning environment, his 
independence of utility-function vis-à-vis his fellowmen — and more generally his 
quite “apolitical” (and even somehow “idiotic”) basic mental dispositions. 
Quite differently from this frame of mind, political life allows for and endless 
redefinition of its ambit, namely of what is and what is not political1, therefore 
susceptible or unsusceptible of being placed into a tradeoff relationship with 
other aspects, that is to say, of what it is adequate to treat as a mere 
“conditional” requisites and what it becomes necessary to consider as 
                                                             
1  As to this aspect, consider Rousseau’s and Jacobins’ assertion according to which pouvoir 
constituant has absolute precedence vis-à-vis any constituted powers: the vis creativa of each 
and every society is more important than any of its creatures.   
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“categorical imperatives”, to use now a philosophizing, Kantian jargon. Just as 
“the value of an human life”, for example, is but a metaphor that we can really, 
but are not forced to take in strictly economic calculative ways, so too lots of 
other elements traditionally considered as belonging to the realms of ethical 
and/or political life can indeed be partially translated into economic language, but 
it is not a safe assumption that this operation is made with both heuristic “gains” 
and for democratic “usefulness”. 
One of the traits that very much characterize the reality of societies 
somehow blocked in their development processes is no doubt the weakness of 
the so-called “public spaces”, that is, how much both political agendas and 
debates are captured by the more influent (and also generally more affluent) 
private interests. In our opinion that’s very much why in these cases, for example, 
municipalities tend to be so weak in the provision of what elsewhere is usually 
taken as public goods: sanitation, security, accesses, gardens, recreation spaces 
for kids and the elderly, etc. At the same time, of course, these goods are often 
susceptible of being provided under the condition of the establishment of what is 
sometimes boldly presented as an exchange of favors, or a crisscross, involving 
strong private entities such as corporations. 
Yet, it would certainly be unfair to refer this state of affairs to the strict 
aspect of difficulties in processes of economic development, since the case of the 
USA as the classical society for the emergence of gated communities (thought as 
typically rich people’s utopias — or dystopias if you prefer, see Raposo and Cotta 
2009) is there to remind us of precisely the importance of cultural specificities 
and their capacity to somehow frame the universe of possibilities for each society, 
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therefore its ability to decide its future: its cultural path-dependence, so to speak. 
Let us remind that, compared with continental Europe, we envisage here a neatly 
more unequal society — for which the twin myths of the “land of opportunity” 
and now also the triumph of “diversity” constitute to our days the imaginary 
compensations (cf. Michaels 2008, Mann 2010) —, with a weaker welfare state, a 
political sphere more openly privatized by the opulent, with a now clear de facto 
disenfranchisement of considerable segments of the poor, lesser expectations as 
to what is expectable from public powers in terms of provision of the basic means 
of life, correspondent compensation in terms of collective pride vis-à-vis the “rest 
of the world” and endless confrontation with external foes, etc.   
At any rate, and be them more or less economically developed, the lack of 
generosity to their misfortunate that these societies exhibit, or how much public 
entities are strong vis-à-vis the weak, is here the obvious reverse of just how 
much the same entities are weak vis-à-vis the strong, that is, of how much public 
life is here indeed a prey for big private interests, and more deeply of how 
political discourse becomes itself a prey of an economics-inspired mind frame, 
which obviously tends to “performatively” reinforce this state of affairs. 
Somewhat ironically, the “pursuit of happiness” taken as a universal right, i. e., as 
something unsusceptible of being for sale (indeed, as a moral value), is probably 
not the least of the casualties here.  
As a tentative conclusive remark I dare mention gated communities as mainly 
a product of simultaneous factors such as: a) situations of “downwards fiscal 
spirals”, correlative to situations of blockages to growth where states withdraw 
from the provision of safety as a “pure public good”; b) high levels of social 
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inequality in the distribution of wealth, associated with quest for distinction, that 
is, conspicuous consumption; c) cascade effects (or cumulative circular causation) 
in both of these dimensions. The possible gains in a “micro” scale, in terms of 
management of funds, by comparison to situations where public authorities 
provide most of urban utilities, is therefore very far from compensating from the 
negative effects this phenomenon is associated with in a more “macro” level: 
social spatial segregation and alienation, rampant particularisms, and specially 
rich people particularism by confrontation with the “planet of slums” (Davis 
2006), loss of civic spirit and citizenship, with subsequently (and correspondently) 
increased difficulties in breaking the vicious circle.    
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